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The Supreme Court's Reanalysis of School
Desegregation Remedial Decrees: Is the
Majority Placing Subtle Limits on the Trial
Court's Vast Equitable Discretion?
Missouri v. Jenkins'
I. INTRODUCTION

Since Brown v. Board ofEducation2 declared in 1954 that "separate but
equal" schools violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause,
federal district courts have implemented remedial decrees to eliminate the
vestiges of past de jure segregation Despite the Supreme Court's numerous
attempts at clarification,4 the, remedial task is still marked by much ambiguity
and broad judicial discretion. Missouri v. Jenkins5 (Jenkins 11) provides the
latest example of the Court's reanalysis of the desegregation issue. Despite
placing subtle limits on the trial court's equitable discretion, Jenkins II still
leaves this broad judicial discretion and the vague legal standards intact.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING

The Kansas City, Missouri School District's (KCMSD) desegregation
litigation began in 1977 when the KCMSD, its school board, and two school
board members' children charged the State of Missouri, the surrounding
suburban school districts (SSD's), and various federal agencies with causing
and maintaining racially segregated schools in the Kansas City metropolitan
area.' The district court dismissed the case against the federal agencies and

1. 115 S.Ct. 2038 (1995).
2. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).

3. "De jure" segregation results from intentional state action. "[Tlhe
differentiating factor between dejure segregation and so-called defacto segregation
...is purpose or intent to segregate." Keyes v. School Dist. Number 1, Denver,
Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973). See also Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977) ("Proof of racially discriminatory intent or
purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.").
4. See infra notes 26-70 and accompanying text.
5. 115 S.Ct. 2038 (1995).
6. Judge Russell Clark of the United States District Court for the Western District
of Missouri entered his initial order in 1978. School Dist. of Kansas City v. Missouri,
460 F. Supp. 421 (W.D. Mo. 1978).
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the SSD's and realigned the KCMSD as a nominal defendant.7 The district
court determined that the State and the KCMSD had operated a segregated
school system within the KCMSD and were liable for an intradistrict
violation. 8 After numerous remedial orders9 and an appeal that ultimately
reached the United States Supreme Court,'" this litigation entered its
eighteenth year with a second trip to the High Court."
The immediate controversy focused on two issues. First, the State
challenged that requiring the State to fund salary increases for the KCMSD
instructional and noninstructional staff was beyond the scope of the district
court's remedial authority.' Second, the State disputed the district court's
order requiring the State to continue funding the remedial quality education
programs for the 1992-93 school year because the State contended that the
KCMSD had attained partial unitary status 3 with respect to the current
quality education programs. 4
Rejecting both of the State's arguments, the district court first declared
that the salary increase was warranted to "improve educational opportunities
and reduce racial isolation" as well as to remedy the vestiges of segregation"

7. Id. at 442.
8. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485, 1490 (W.D. Mo. 1984).
9. See Christina J. Nielsen, Note, Missouri v. Jenkins: The UncertainFuture of
School Desegregation,64 UMKC L. REv. 613, 616-19 (1996).
10. Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 (1989) [hereinafter Jenkins1]. InJenkins I,
the Court addressed whether the district court could directly levy taxes to fund the
desegregation remedies. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990). In earlier
decrees, the district court had ordered the State of Missouri to pay the greater share
of the desegregation costs. Jenkins, 593 F. Supp. at 1485. These desegregation costs
amounted to over a total of $448 million for the magnet school program and in excess
of $540 million for total court-ordered capital improvements. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115
S. Ct. 2038, 2043-44 (1995).
11. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038 (1995) [hereinafter Jenkins 11.
12. Petitioner's Reply Brief, Missouri v. Jenkins, No. 93-1823, 1994 WL 710859
at *17 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 20, 1994) (relating to the District Court Order of June 15,
1992; District Court Order of June 30, 1993; and District Court Order of July 30,
1993).
13. See infranotes 62-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme
Court's test for determining "unitary status."
14. Petitioner's Reply Brief, Missouri v. Jenkins, No. 93-1823, 1994 WL 710859,
at *18 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 20, 1994) (relating to the District Court Order of June 17,
1992).
15. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of what
constitutes a "vestige" of segregation.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss3/7
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by improving the "desegregative attractiveness"'16 of the KCMSD. 7
Second, although the district court did not address whether or not the KCMSD
had achieved partial unitary status, it summarily ordered continued funding of
the quality education programs for the 1992-93 school year."
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed both district court
orders. 9 In rejecting the State's first argument that the salary increases
exceeded the scope of the district court's remedial authority, the Eighth Circuit
explained that the remedial purpose was "designed to reverse white flight by
offering superior educational opportunities."2' Second, the Court of Appeals
found that the district court had implicitly rejected the State's request for a
determination of partial unitary status as to the quality education programs
because mere implementation of the programs alone was not sufficient.
Moreover, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that "[t]he school district was far from
reaching its maximum potential because KCMSD is still at or below national
norms at many grade levels" in academic achievement. 2'
The United States Supreme Court granted the State's petition for
certiorari to consider the following:

16. "Desegregative attractiveness" which seeks to induce integrated attendance
represents a rationale for ordering compensatory educational relief. Magnet schools
which offer specialized educational programs exemplify one method of promoting
integration. For examples of magnet school desegregation remedies, see Jenkins 11,
115 S. Ct. 2038, 2043 (1995); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 635 F. Supp.
1538, 1541-42 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), aff'd, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied,489
U.S. 1055 (1988); and Liddell v. Missouri, 731 F.2d 1294, 1309-13 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 816 (1984).

Some commentators criticize the use of compensatory programs as a tool to
induce integration because measures designed to attract white pupils may take priority
over remedial programs designed to cure minority educational harm. See, e.g., Robert
L. Crain & Rita E. Mahard, How Desegregation Orders May Improve Minority

Academic Achievement, 16 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 693, 707 (1982) ("Concentration
on methods designed to prevent white flight increases the likelihood that district funds
will be diverted into services appealing to middle-class white parents at the expense
of sacrificing compensatory and human relations programs meeting minority needs.");
and DANIEL V. MONTI, A SEMBLANCE OF JUSTICE: ST. Louis DESEGREGATION AND

ORDER IN URBAN AMERICA (1985) (commenting that the school board used funds to

upgrade system and gave second priority to black grievances).
17. See supra note 12.
18. See supra note 14.

19. Missouri v. Jenkins, 11 F.3d 755, 757 (8th Cir. 1993).
20. Id. at 767; see also Missouri v. Jenkins 13 F.3d 1170, 1172 (8th Cir. 1993)
(affirming the district court's June 30, 1993 and July 30, 1993 orders).
21. Jenkins, 11 F.3d at 762.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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1. Whether the District Court exceeded its constitutional authority when it
granted salary increases to virtually all instructional and noninstructional
employees of the KCMSD, and
2. Whether the District Court properly relied upon the fact that student
achievement test scores had failed to rise to some unspecified level when
it declined to find that the State had achieved partial unitary status as to the
quality education programs.22
Reversing the court of appeals, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the
majority, held that the salary increases designed to improve "desegregative
23
attractiveness" (an interdistrict goal) exceeded the scope of the intradistrict
violation. 4 Furthermore, the majority held that whether or not the KCMSD
student achievement levels reach national norms does not constitute the
appropriate test for deciding whether a school district has achieved partial
unitary status. Consequently, the Supreme Court held that the district court
"should sharply limit, if not dispense with, its reliance on this factor.""5
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. A DistrictCourt'sRemedial DecreePowers in School Desegregation
In 1954, the Supreme Court ruled, in Brown v. Board of Education
(Brown ),26
that state-imposed racial segregation in public schools violated
the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The next year, in
Brown 11,27 the Court held that the school authorities bear the primary
responsibility for remedying its constitutional violations.28
This
responsibility includes the "affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be
necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would
be eliminated root and branch."2 "

22. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S.Ct. 41 (1994).
23. See infra notes 51-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of interdistrict
versus intradistrict violations and remedies.
24. JenkinsfI, 115 S.Ct. 2038, 2052 (1995).
25. Id, at 2055.
26. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
27. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
28. Brown 1H, 349 U.S. at 299. See also Note, Allocating the Burden of Proof
after a Findingof Unitarinessin School DesegregationLitigation, 100 HARV. L. REV.
653, 653 (1987) (A finding of intentional segregation "places the school board under
an affirmative duty to change the system from a dual to a 'unitary' one.").
29. Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
For other Supreme Court decisions imposing an affirmative duty on the school
authorities to eliminate the dual school system, see Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss3/7
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In fashioning these remedial decrees, the lower courts could exercise their
equitable powers.3" The Court noted that "[t]raditionally, equity has been
characterized by a practical flexibility in shaping its remedies ....
power to fashion a remedy
Therefore, the district courts possessed a "broad
32
that [would] assure a unitary school system.
However, limits on the district court's broad remedial powers did exist.
For instance, "[t]he nature of the violation determines the scope of the
remedy. 3 3 Consequently, the Court emphasized that these remedial decrees
should target:
[e]limination of the discrimination inherent in the dual school systems, not
with the myriad factors of human existence which can cause discrimination
in a multitude of ways .... The elimination of racial discrimination in
public schools ... should not be retarded by efforts to achieve broader
purposes lying beyond the jurisdiction of school authorities . . .. Our
objective . . . does not and cannot embrace all the problems of racial

443 U.S. 526, 537 (1979); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 460-61
(1979); and Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 301.
30. Brown 1, 349 U.S. at 300. See 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOVAK,
TREATISE ON CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW § 18.9(a)(1) (2d ed. 1992) (district courts have
broad equitable powers to remedy past wrongs as breadth and flexibility are inherent
in equitable remedies).
31. Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 299. Following Brown I, the desegregation decisions
have been described by commentators as a "patchwork of unintelligibility," "chaos out
of confusion," and "surrealistic." James S. Liebman, Implementing Brown in the
Nineties: Political Reconstruction, Liberal Recollection, and Litigatively Enforced

Legislative Reform, 76 VA. L. REV. 349, 352 (1990) (citing Mark G. Yuduf, School
Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration and Social Science Research
in the Supreme Court,42 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 87, 99, 102, 105 (1978)). See
also Chip Jones, Comment, Freeman v. Pitts: Congress Can (And Should?) Limit
FederalCourt Jurisdiction in School DesegregationCases, 47 SMU L. REV. 1889,
1901-02 (1994) (discussing that such a vague instruction to the district courts has
resulted in "decades of confusion about the role of the courts in supervising school
desegregation plans.").
32. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971); see
also Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974) [hereinafter Millikenl]; LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §§ 16-18, at 1488-89 (2d ed. 1988)
(quoting Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 299): "'Because of their proximity to local conditions
and the possible need for further hearings', the federal district courts were delegated
the primary responsibility to supervise the 'transition to a system of public education

freed of racial discrimination."'
33. Swann, 402 U.S. at 16. See also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992)
("A remedy is justifiable only insofar as it advances the ultimate objective of
alleviating the initial constitutional violation.").
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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prejudice, even when those problems contribute to disproportionate racial
concentrations in some schools.34
Therefore, the district court would exceed its equitable authority if its
orders included remedies aimed at conditions that did not violate the
Constitution, did not result from such violation, or sought to encompass
governmental units that the constitutional violation neither involved nor
affected. 5
Nonetheless, the Court subsequently determined that desegregation
decrees could address more than simply racial imbalances caused by unlawful
segregation. 6 Because Brown I held that "[s]eparate educational facilities are
inherently unequal,"37 federal courts also could require remedial educational
programs38 designed to overcome the inherent inequalities flowing from the
unconstitutional dual school system.39
To assist district courts in exercising their equitable powers, the Court,
in Milliken 1, formulated the following three-part framework:

34. Id.at 22-23.
35. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977) [hereinafter Milliken 11];
see
Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434 (1976).
36. Milliken 1,433 U.S. at 282-83. See Tracy Ellen Sivitz, Note, Eliminatingthe
Continuing Effects of the Violation: Compensatory Education as a Remedy for
Unlmvful School Segregation, 97 YALE L.J. 1173, 1175 (1988) ("The Milliken 1H
decision significantly advanced prior desegregation jurisprudence by holding that
complete remediation of unconstitutional racial segregation and its effects may require
eliminating not only widespread systemic or institutional effects of the violation but
also the individualized educational harms produced by segregation.").
37. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 495 (1954).
38. Examples of remedial education programs include early childhood
intervention, curriculum development, reduction in pupil-teacher ratios, counseling and
career guidance, remedial reading, and staff development.
39. Milliken 1,433 U.S. at 282-83 ("[D]iscriminatory student assignment policies
can themselves manifest and breed other inequalities built into a dual school system
founded on racial discrimination. Federal courts need not, and cannot, close their eyes
to inequalities, shown by the record, which flow from a longstanding segregated
system."). See United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225
(1963) (to eliminate the effects of prior segregation, federal courts can address matters
other than pupil assignment).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss3/7
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1. The remedy must relate to the condition that violates the Constitution."
2. [The decree must indeed be remedial in nature, that is, it must be
designed as nearly as possible 'to restore the victims of discriminatory
conduct to the position they would have occupied in the absence of such
conduct.'4
3. [T]he federal courts in devising a remedy must take into account the
interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs,
consistent with the Constitution.42
Therefore, to determine the scope of the violation and satisfy the first
step in the Milliken 1I framework, the district courts must identify the vestiges

40. Milliken 11, 433 U.S. at 280 (emphasis in original). See Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971); see also Millikenl, 418 U.S. 717,
746 (1974).
In the Jenkinslitigation, the district court found the constitutional violation to be
the state segregation existing prior to 1954. Jenkins v. Missouri, 593 F. Supp. 1485,
1490 (W.D. Mo. 1984). The effects of this unconstitutionality took the form of low
academic achievement and racial imbalances throughout the schools in the KCMSD.
Id. at 1492.
41. Milliken 11, 433 U.S. at 280 (quoting Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 746) (emphasis
added). For the Jenkins remedial orders, the district court implemented broad-based
remedial orders that included the creation of magnet schools-all in the pursuit of
"desegregative attractiveness" as well as the correction of the "system-wide reduction
in student achievement." Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp. 19, 23-24 (W.D.Mo.
1985), aff'd, 807 F.2d 657 (8th Cir. 1986), and cert. denied sub nom., Kansas City,
Mo. Sch. Dist. v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 816 (1987). See also Nielsen, supra note 9, at
616-19, citing the various remedial orders.
42. Milliken 1,433 U.S. at 280-81 (emphasis added). See also infra notes 65-67
and accompanying text for a discussion of the importance of considering local
interests.
However, the Milliken II Court also noted that eliminating individualized harms
would require significant time and effort because compensatory programs
were not, and as a practical matter could not be, intended to wipe the slate
clean by one bold stroke .... Rather, by the nature of the antecedent
violation.... the victims... will continue to experience the effects of
segregation until such future time as the remedial programs can help
dissipate the continuing effects of past misconduct....
Id. at 290.
Alternatively, see Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490 (1992) ("Returning schools
to the control of local authorities at the earliest practicable date is essential. ...") and
Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247 (1991), remandedto Dowell v. Board
of Educ., 778 F. Supp. 1144 (W.D. Okla 1991), and affd, 8 F.3d 1501 (10th Cir.
1993) ("From the very first, federal supervision of local school systems was intended
as a temporary measure ....).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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of segregation.43 The Court, in Green v. County School Board,' found that

the most important vestiges of a segregated system include the school district's
policy and practice regarding faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular
activities and facilities. However, these factors are neither exclusive nor
rigid.4"
A present condition that is too attenuated from the former school
segregation will not qualify as a vestige. For example, in Pasadena City
Board of Education v. Spangler,4 6 the Court found that the district court
exceeded its remedial authority by ordering annual readjustment of attendance
zones after the school district had already established a racially neutral student
assignment system. The Court concluded that "subsequent changes in the
racial mix in the Pasadena schools might be caused by factors for which the
defendants could not be considered responsible."4" Following this principle,
the Court in Freemanv. Pitts48 held that "[t]he vestiges of segregation that
are the concern of the law... may be subtle and intangible but nonetheless
they must be so real that they have a causal link to the de jure violation being
remedied."49
43. "Vestiges" consist of those effects of intentional discrimination which, if
unremedied, maintain the regime of school segregation. These vestiges represent the
central focus of school desegregation remedies. Swann, 402 U.S. at 15-16.
44. 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968). See Sivann, 402 U.S. at 18.
45. Freeman,503 U.S. at 493. See G. Scott Williams, Unitary School Systems
and UnderlyingVestiges ofState-ImposedSegregation,87 COLUM. L. REV. 794, 799-

805 (1987) (distinguishing between "surface" vestiges-amenable to relatively swift
remedial action-and "underlying" vestiges-not eliminated by mere implementation
of a desegregation plan).
46. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
at 434 (the court rejected that "white flight" caused the racial movement
47. Id.
as the trends occurring in Pasadena closely patterned the state-wide trends in both
segregated and desegregated California schools). See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 495
("Where resegregation is a product not of state action but of private choices, it does
not have constitutional implications."). For a discussion of "white flight" and its
effects on desegregation, see Steven I. Locke, Comment, Board of Education v.
Dowell: A Look at the New Phase in DesegregationLaw, 21 HOFSTRA L. REv. 537,

546 n.81 (1992).
48. 503 U.S. 467 (1992). The Freeman Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit's
holding that a school district must provide "'heroic,' 'even bizarre' measures to attain
racial balance when the imbalance is attributable neither to the prior dejure system nor
to a later violation by the school district but rather to independent demographic
forces." 61 U.S.L.W. (BNA) 3054 (Aug. 4, 1992) (quoting Pitts v. Freeman, 887 F.2d
1438 (11th Cir. 1989)).
at 496. See Jones, supra note 31, at 1910-11 ("With Freeman,the Court
49. Id.
adds a new qualifier in measuring whether a school district has met its burden to
desegregate-pragmatism.").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss3/7

8

Feutz: Feutz: Supreme Court's Reanalysis of School Desegregation Remedial Decrees:
SCHOOL DESEGREGATION DECREES

1996]

In addition, the Court noted in Spanglerthat the district court should give
the school board a precise statement of its obligations under a desegregative
decree.5"
Another important factor in determining a remedial decree's scope
requires distinguishing between intradistrict and interdistrict violations and
remedies.5' In Milliken I, the Court found that the district court exceeded its
equitable authority by ordering an interdistrict remedy when the surrounding
suburban school districts had not violated the Constitution, and the Detroit
school district violations had not produced significant segregative effects in
these surrounding districts. 2 The Court noted that school district lines
cannot be "casually ignored or treated as a mere administrative
convenience." 3
In Hills v. Gautreaux,54 the Court explained its ruling in Milliken I
regarding metropolitan area school desegregation orders. The Court noted that
"[n]othing in the Milliken decision suggests a per se rule that federal courts
lack authority to order parties found to have violated the Constitution to
undertake remedial efforts beyond the municipal boundaries of the city where
the violation occurred."55 Rather, the Milliken I proposed remedy failed
because the federal judiciary could not order a mandatory interdistrict remedy
on state and local political entities that did not violate the Constitution and
where a violation did not produce significant segregative effects in these

50. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 434 (1976). See also
Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 246-50 (1991) (the constitutional violators
are "entitled to a rather precise statement of [their] obligations under a desegregation
decree.")
51. Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 745 ("[A]n interdistrict remedy might be in order
where the racially discriminatory acts of one or more school districts caused racial
segregation in an adjacent district, or where district lines have been deliberately drawn
on the basis of race. In such circumstances an interdistrict remedy would be
appropriate to eliminate the interdistrict segregation directly caused by the
constitutional violation.").
In the Jenkins litigation, the district court found the violation to have occurred
only within the KCMSD and thus to establish only an intradistrict violation as opposed
to an interdistrict violation. Jenkins v. Missouri, 931 F.2d 470, 475 (8th Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 967 (1991); Jenkins v. Missouri, 931 F.2d 1273-74 (8th Cir.
1991), cert. denied,502 U.S. 925 (1991); Jenkins v. Missouri, 838 F.2d 260, 264 (8th
Cir.), cert. granted in part, 488 U.S. 888 (1988), cert. denied in part, 488 U.S. 889
(1988), and affd, 491 U.S. 274 (1989).
52. Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 745.
53. Id at 741.
54. 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
55. Id. at 298.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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non-violating districts. 6 On the other hand, a court could order a
constitutional violator to implement a remedy that expanded beyond the
violation's boundaries.
Moreover, the Court distinguished the Gautreaux situation from
Milliken I and concluded that in this case a metropolitan area remedy was
proper despite the absence of an interdistrict violation or significant
segregative effects outside the Chicago city limits.58 The rationale for this
holding focused on the constitutional violators' (Chicago Housing Authority
and the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development) statutory
authority to operate outside the Chicago city limits as well as on the absence
of displacing any of the suburban governmental entities' rights and powers. 9
Consequently, the Court found this order would be "wholly commensurate
with the 'nature and extent of the constitutional violation."'"
B. RelinquishingJurisdictionOver a Desegregation
Order-The Test for Determininga
School District'sUnitary Status
After ordering, implementing, and monitoring the remedial decree, the
final step and goal is for the district court to relinquish jurisdiction over the
order and leave local authorities with the charge to continue to operate a
unitary school system." Before relinquishing jurisdiction, the district court
must determine if the school district has achieved a unitary status. 2 The
term "unitary" connotes a school system that complies with the Constitution's
Equal Protection Clause.63 In other words, the school district must eliminate

56. Id. In Milliken 1,the remedy involved a mandatory interdistrict reassignment
of students through busing. 418 U.S. at 745. Cf.Jenkins 1, 495 U.S. at 59-60
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (citing Milliken v.
Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 272 (1977), for the proposition that magnet schools encourage
voluntary desegregation of students as opposed to mandatory busing or redrawing of
district boundary lines).
57. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. at 298.
58. Id. at 305.
59. Id.
at 298.
at 300 (quoting Milliken 1,418 U.S. at 744).
60. Id.
61. Milliken 11, 433 U.S. at 280-81.
62. Green v. County Sch. Bd. of New Kent County, 391 U.S. 430, 436-38 (1986).
63. Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Schs. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 246
(1991). The Dowell Court explained that "[c]ourts have used the terms "dual" to
denote a school system which has engaged in intentional segregation of students by
race, and "unitary" to describe a school system which has been brought into
compliance with the command of the Constitution." Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss3/7
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the vestiges of de jure segregation to the extent practicable.'
The Court regarded federal supervision over school systems as "a
temporary measure to remedy past discrimination." 6' The Court based this
decision on the concern for local control over public school systems.6 ' The
Court recently reaffirmed this precept in Freeman: "Returning schools to the
is essential to restore
control of local authorities at the earliest practicable date
67
their true accountability in our governmental system.u
Nonetheless, the Court noted that a district court "need not accept at face
value the profession of a school board which has intentionally discriminated
that it will cease to do so in the future."68 The Freeman Court articulated a
three-factor guide to assist the lower courts in determining whether to declare
that a school district has achieved unitary status and whether to fully or
partially withdraw judicial supervision:
1. [W]hether there has been full and satisfactory compliance with the
decree in those aspects of the system where supervision is to be withdrawn;
2. whether retention of judicial control is necessary or practicable to
achieve compliance with the decree in other facets of the school system;

Several legal commentators have noted that courts encounter difficulty in
determining when a school district has attained "unitary status." See, e.g., Freeman v.
Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1443-44 (1992) ("the term 'unitary' is not a precise concept
[and] does not have fixed meaning or content"); Kevin Brown, Termination ofPublic
School Desegregation: Determinationof Unitary Status Based on the Eliminationof
Invidious Value Inculcation, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1105, 1107 n.7 (1990) ("There

is a considerable amount of confusion about the terminology in this area."); and
Bradley W. Joondeph, Note, Killing Brown Softly: The Subtle Undermining of
Effective Desegregationin Freeman v. Pitts, 46 STAN. L. REv.147, 148 n.4 (1993).

64. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 250. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text for
a discussion of the factors Green identified as among the vestiges of segregation.
65. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 247. See also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433
U.S. 406, 410 (1977) (stating that "local autonomy of school districts is a vital national
tradition"); and Milliken 1, 418 U.S. at 742 (explaining the importance of local control
over education in relation to the intent that remedial decrees not extend in perpetuity).
66. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248. See also Milliken 11, 433 U.S. at 280-82. For

commentary supporting this proposition, see John E. Canady, Jr., Comment,
Overcoming OriginalSin: The Redemption of the DesegregatedSchool System, 27
Hous. L. REv. 557, 558 (1990).
67. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490 (1992). For commentary on this case,
see David Crump, From Freeman to Brown and Back Again: Principle,Pragmatism,
and Proximate Cause in the School DesegregationDecisions, 68 WASH. L. REV. 753
(1993); John Dayton, Desegregation: Is the Court Preparingto Say it is Finished?,
84 EDUC. L. REP. 897 (1993); Jones, supra note 31, at 1889; and Joondeph, supra note
63, at 147.
68. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 249.
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3. and whether the school district has demonstrated, to the public and to
the parents and students of the once disfavored race, its good faith
commitment to the whole of the court's decree and to those provisions of
the law and constitution that were the predicate for judicial intervention in
the first instance.69
In analyzing whether a school district has eliminated the vestiges of
segregation to the extent practicable, the Court further concluded in Freeman
that the vestiges would less likely be the result of a prior segregated system
as time passes from the initial violation. In addition, the Court noted that a
school district's demonstrated good faith can further attenuate the causal link
between current conditions and the prior violation."°
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. Majority Opinion
The United States Supreme Court granted the State's petition for
certiorari to consider the following:
1. Whether the District Court exceeded its constitutional authority when it
granted salary increases to virtually all instructional and noninstructional
employees of the KCMSD, and
2. Whether the District Court properly relied upon the fact that student
achievement test scores had failed to rise to some unspecified level when
it declined to find that the State had achieved partial unitary status as to the
quality education programs.7'
In Jenkins II, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the five-justice
majority,72 decided that a proper determination of the ultimate issues in the
case 73 required analyzing the district court's scope of remedial authority. 4

69. Freeman,503 U.S. at 491.
70. Id. at 496. See also Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 299 (instructing courts "to consider
whether the action of the school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of
the governing constitutional principles.").
71. Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 41 (1994).
72. Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas j6ined the majority opinion.
73. See supra notes 21, 71 and accompanying text for the questions on which the
Court granted certiorari.
74. Jenkins I, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2047 (1995). The majority concluded that the
State's challenge to the remedy's scope was "fairly included in the question presented."
Id However, Justice Souter argued in dissent that the majority's consideration of this
foundational issue exceeds the issues on which certiorari was granted. Id. at 2073-74.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss3/7
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Because the district court based its salary order on increasingthe desegregative
attractiveness of the KCMSD, the Court considered whether relying on
desegregative attractiveness was proper in order to adequately resolve the
State's challenge to the court's order.7"
The Court recognized that limits exist on a district court's admittedly
broad remedial powers. Citing Swann, the Court acknowledged that the courts
should not direct their orders at broader purposes beyond the jurisdiction of
the school authorities.76 For instance, the Court referred to Milliken I as a
case where a district court exceeded its authority by imposing an interdistrict
remedy when the surrounding school districts had not violated the
Constitution. "[W]ithout an interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect, there
is no constitutional wrong calling for an interdistrict remedy."77
The Court noted that the district court found, and the court of appeals
affirmed, that Jenkins II did not involve an interdistrict constitutional violation
nor an interdistrict effect and, therefore, interdistrict relief was not
warranted.78 Although the Court recognized its previous approval of a
desegregation remedy involving magnet schools,79 the Court justified this
approval of intradistrict magnets based upon the remedy's limited purpose of
voluntarily redistributing students within the school district. However, the
Court distinguished Jenkins because the KCMSD magnet schools proposed to
attract nonminority students from outside the KCMSD. The Court stated:
[T]his interdistrict goal is beyond the scope of the intradistrict violation
identified by the District Court. In effect, the District Court has devised a
remedy to accomplish indirectly what it admittedly lacks the remedial
authority to mandate directly: the interdistrict transfer of students. 80
As a result, the Court held that the "District Court's pursuit of
'desegregative
attractiveness' [was] beyond the scope of its remedial
81
authority."
Furthermore, the Court rejected the school district's argument to expand
the intradistrict remedy into the SSD's through the pursuit of desegregative
attractiveness because past segregation led to "white flight" from the KCMSD

75. Id. at 2047.
76. Id. at 2048 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S.
1, 22-23 (1971)).
77. Id. (quoting Milliken 1, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974)).
78. Id. at 2050, 2053. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 807 F.2d 657, 672 (8th Cir.
1986).
79. Jenkinsll, 115 S. Ct. at 2051; see, e.g.,Milliken11, 433 U.S. 267, 272 (1977).
80. Jenkins 11, 115 S. Ct. at 2051 (emphasis in original).
81. Id. at 2052.
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to the SSD's.82 The Court found that the lower courts' findings on whether
segregation or desegregation caused white flight were "inconsistent
'
Nonetheless, the lower courts both concluded that no
internally."83
interdistrict violation nor interdistrict effect existed.84
Similarly, the Court rejected Justice Souter's claim that this holding
overruled Gautreaux85 and the permissibility of a metropolitan area remedy
in the absence of a finding of an interdistrict violation.86 The Court
distinguished Gautreaux from the present case because Gautreaux imposed a
remedy on a federal agency. Consequently, Gautreaux"did not raise the same
are implicated when a federal court issues a remedial
federalism concerns that
87
order against a State.,

Based on this analysis, the Court found the district's pursuit of
desegregative attractiveness "is not susceptible to any objective limitation..
. [and] cannot be reconciled with our cases placing limitations on a district
court's remedial authority."88 As a result, the Court concluded that the
district court's order of salary increases, which was based on "remedying the
vestiges of segregation by improving the desegregative attractiveness of the
KCMSD" was "simply too far removed from an acceptable implementation of
a permissible means to remedy previous legally mandated segregation." 9
Turning to the second issue, the Court reversed the district court's order
that required the State to continue funding the quality education programs
because the KCMSD had not attained "its maximum potential because the
District is still at or below national norms at many grade levels." 90 To
clarify, the Court reasoned that "improved achievement on test scores is not
necessarily required for the State to achieve partial unitary status ...

,

the

District,91Court should sharply limit, if not dispense with, its reliance on this
factor."

Furthermore, the Court instructed the District Court, in reconsidering its
order, to apply the Freemanthree-part test.92

82. Id. at 2052-53.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2053.
85. Id. at 2090 (Souter, J. dissenting). See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Gautreaux's holding regarding the permissibility of a

metropolitan area remedy.
86. Jenkins 11, 115 S. Ct. at 2053.
87. Id. at 2054.

88. Id.
89. Id at 2055.

90. Id. (quoting Appendix to Petition for Certiorari A-131).
91. Id.
92. Id. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss3/7
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In addition, the Court prescribed that the district court revise its
determination that "[s]egregation has caused a system wide reduction in
achievement" 93 in the KCMSD and precisely identify segregation's
incremental effects on minority student achievement as well as the quality
education program's specific goals to correct these deficits. 9
Based on this analysis, the Court noted that "numerous external factors
beyond the control of the KCMSD and the State affect minority student
achievement. So long as these external factors are not the result of
segregation, they do not figure in the remedial calculus."95

B. Justice O'Connor'sConcurringOpinion
Justice O'Connor, writing in concurrence, emphasized that the Court's
decision followed Gautreaux as federal courts may order constitutional
violators "to undertake remedial efforts beyond the municipal boundaries of
the city where the violation occurred."9 6 However, Justice O'Connor
highlighted that transgressing territorial boundaries is only permissible when
"the intradistrict constitutional violation produced significant interdistrict
segregative effects."'97
Next, Justice O'Connor rejected Justice Souter's view regarding "white
flight's" role in causing segregative effects. She reasoned that "white flight"
resulted in an increased number of white students absorbed into a unitary
system and, thus, was not "segregative beyond the KCMSD."'9 8
Consequently, Justice O'Connor concluded that since the lower courts
found neither an interdistrict violation nor a significant interdistrict segregative
effect," the district court "cannot order remedies seeking to rectify regional
demographic trends that go beyond the nature and scope of the violation."" °

Freemantest for determining unitary status.
93. Jenkins 11, 115 S. Ct. at 2055 (quoting Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F. Supp 19,
24 (W.D. Mo. 1986)) (emphasis in original).
94. Id.

95. Id. at 2056 (emphasis added).
96. Id.
at 2057 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S.
284, 298 (1976)).
97. Id. at 2057, 2059. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Milliken I and Gautreauxrequirements related to segregative effects
and metropolitan area remedies.
98. Jenkins 11, 115 S. Ct. at 2059.

99. See Jenkins, 807 F.2d 657, 672 (8th Cir. 1986).
100. Jenkins 11, 115 S.Ct. at 2060.
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C. Justice Thomas's ConcurringOpinion
Justice Thomas, writing in concurrence, addressed the following
themes.' First, he reasoned that "mere defacto segregation (unaccompanied
by discriminatory inequalities in educational resources) does not constitute a
continuing harm after the end of dejure segregation. 'Racial isolation' itself
is not a harm; only state-enforced segregation is."' 2
Second, Justice Thomas expressed the need to circumscribe the federal
equitable power by imposing more precise standards and guidelines.
Decreasing judicial discretion would ensure that judicial remedies target those
actually injured as well as restore predictability in the law.'0 3
Finally, Justice Thomas concluded that de jure segregation remedies
should not include educational programs for students who were not in school
when segregation existed.'"
D. Justice Souter's Dissenting Opinion
Justice Souter, writing for the dissent,0 stated that the majority's going
beyond the two questions presented in the petition for certiorari and reaching
the broader foundational question regarding the scope and validity of the
district court's magnet school remedy "does not survive scrutiny."006
Instead, Justice Souter found that these questions were "answerable on their
own terms."' 0 7
In determining the propriety of the district court's salary orders, Justice
Souter found that to the extent that these orders "are justified by reference to
the quality of education alone, nothing in the Court's opinion precludes those
orders from remaining in effect."' °8 The dissent noted that the district court
had "consistently treated salary increases as an important element in remedying
the system-wide reduction in student achievement"'" and did not solely

101. For further analysis, see Jenkins HI, 115 S. Ct. at 2061-73 (Thomas, J.,
concurring), as a more complete analysis is beyond the scope of this Note.
102. Jenkins 11, 115 S. Ct. at 2065.
103. Id. at 2071.
104. Id.at 2073.
105. Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer also joined the dissent.
106. Jenkins l, 115 S. Ct. at 2077 (Souter, J., dissenting); see id.
at 2076-78 for
a discussion regarding the procedural issue, as further analysis lies beyond the scope
of this Note.
107. Jenkins 1, 115 S. Ct. at 2083.
108. Id.
109. Id.at 2081; see District Court Order of June 25, 1992; Missouri v. Jenkins,
855 F.2d 1295, 1301 (8th Cir. 1988); and Missouri v. Jenkins, 672 F. Supp. 400, 410
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss3/7
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justify its orders on the basis of desegregative attractiveness."0
In determining the role of student test scores when seeking termination
of a desegregation decree, Justice Souter contended that none of the lower
courts' orders required "a certain level of test scores before unitary status can
be found, or indicates that test scores are the only thing standing between the
State and a finding of unitary status.""' Instead, the dissent noted that the
State did not attempt to make the showing required by Freeman". for
partial relief from the desegregation decree."' Rather, Justice Souter stated
that the State only claimed that the quality education programs had been
the reduction
implemented but failed to show that the programs "had remedied
4
in student achievement ...to the extent practicable.""
Consequently, the dissent stated that if the State made a proper motion
for unitary status regarding the educational programs, test scores would,
nonetheless, "undoubtedly play a role""' 5 in determining whether the
improvement programs have cured a deficiency in student achievement to the
extent practicable. However, requiring the students of the school district to
achieve the national average would not be a prerequisite to unitary status
because other causes separate from prior school segregation vestiges could
impede achieving this goal." 6
After addressing these two specific questions, the dissent proceeded to
address the validity of the KCMSD's magnet remedy. The dissent attacked
the Court's "assumption" that "the effects of segregation were wholly
contained within the KCMSD" and that, therefore, any interdistrict remedy
was improper." 7 In support, Justice Souter acknowledged that simply
because the lower court found no significant segregative effects in the
SSD's" and classified the problem as an "intradistrict violation,""19 the
possibility existed that the State and the KCMSD's action "produced
significant non-segregative effects outside the KCMSD that led to greater

(W.D. Mo. 1987).
110. Jenkins 11, 115 S. Ct. at 2081 (Souter, J., dissenting).
111. It at 2078.
112. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Freemantest for partial unitary status.
113. JenkinsI, 115 S. Ct. at 2079-80 (Souter, J., dissenting).
114. Id. at 2079.
115. Id. at 2080.
116. Id. at 2081.
117. Id. at 2083.
118. Jenkins v. Missouri, 807 F.2d 657, 664, 668-70, 672, 678 (8th Cir. 1986);
and District Court Order of June 5, 1984.
119. Jenkins, 807 F.2d at 672, 678.
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segregation within it." 2 For example, the dissent referred to the lower
courts' finding that "segregated schools ... halve] led to white flight from the
KCMSD to suburban districts ....

,,

The dissent chastised the Majority

for its "arbitrary supposition" that "'white flight' may result from
desegregation, not de jure segregation.""
As a contrary explanation to this cause-and-effect dilemma, the dissent
explained that: "There would be no desegregation orders ...

without prior

unconstitutional segregation..., and an adverse reaction to a desegregation
23
order is traceable in fact to the segregation that is subject to the remedy.'
Next, Justice Souter asserted that the Court's decision redefined
Milliken !'s concept of an interdistrict remedy 2 and, thus, substantially
limited the permissible remedies for prior segregation by "categorically
forbidding imposition of a remedy on a guilty district with intended
consequences in a neighboring innocent district" in the absence of segregative
effects in the innocent district. 25 The dissent contended that Milliken I
classified an interdistrict remedy as the "imposition of remedial measures on
more than one wrongdoing school district." 2 6 Justice Souter further
explained that Milliken I did not hold that:
any remedy that takes into account conditions outside of the district.
[was] an 'interdistrict remedy,' and as such improper in the absence of an
'interdistrict violation.' To the contrary, . . . we left open the possibility

that a district court might subject a proven constitutional wrongdoer to a
remedy with intended effects going beyond the district of the wrongdoer's
violation, when such a remedy is necessary to redress the harms flowing
from the constitutional violation."
In addition, Justice Souter concluded that the Majority's opinion
effectively overruled Gautreaux's holding'
allowing a remedy that

120. Jenkins 1, 115 S.Ct at 2084 (Souter, J., dissenting).
121. Id. (quoting District Court Order of August 25, 1986).
122. Id. (quoting Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2052). See Jenkins 11, 115 S. Ct. at
2084-85 for Justice Souter's analysis of the lower courts' findings regarding
interdistrict effects.
123. Jenkins 11, 115 S. Ct. at 2085. See also id. at 2085-86 for Justice Souter's
analysis of segregation and desegregation's effects on "white flight."
124. See supranotes 51-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of interdistrict
remedies.
125. JenkinsI, 115 S. Ct. at 2088 (Souter, J., dissenting).
126. Id.
at 2087.
127. Id at 2087-88.
128. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text for a discussion of Hills v.
Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss3/7
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extended beyond the constitutional violator's own jurisdiction (even in the
absence of segregative effects beyond that jurisdiction) provided that the
remedy did not bind the authorities of the non-violating districts.'29 Under
Gautreaux,the Dissent found that the KCMSD's magnet school remedy and
its measures to increase the district's desegregative attractiveness would fall
"entirely within the scope of equitable authority .. .[and appear] 'wholly

' 1 30
commensurate with the nature and extent of the constitutional violation. "

E. Justice Ginsburg'sDissenting Opinion
Justice Ginsburg also wrote a dissenting opinion. 131 Noting her
agreement with Justice Souter's dissent, Justice Ginsburg added that the
history of segregation in Missouri dated back to 1724, with the first
desegregation remedial order issued only ten years ago. Therefore, "[g]iven
the deep, inglorious history of segregation in Missouri, to curtail desegregation
at this time and in this manner is an action at once too swift and too
soon."

132

V. COMMENT
School desegregation remedial decrees have the inherent virtues and
33
problems that stem from their grounding in the court's equitable powers.'
Broad standards-for example, that "the nature of the violation determines the
scope of the remedy"' 34 and that the court should design the decree as nearly
as possible "to restore the victims of discriminatory conduct to the position
they would have occupied in the absence of such conduct"' 3 5 -allow the
district courts the flexibility and sensitivity to craft particular remedies
36
designed to correct the unique problems stemming from each violation.'

129. Gautreaux,425 U.S. 284, 288-90.
130. Jenkins 11, 115 S.Ct. at 2089 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Hills v.
Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 300 (1976) (quoting Milliken 1, 418 U.S. 717, 744 (1974))).
dissenting).
131. Id. at 2091 (Ginsburg, J.,
132. Id.
133. See Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2067 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("Such
extravagant uses of judicial power are at odds with the history and tradition of the
equity power and the Framers' design.").
134. Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971).
135. Milliken 1,418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974).
136. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court 1978 Term-Foreword: The
Forms ofJustice,93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 47 (1979) ("The concept 'violation can be used
to describe the object of the remedy only if it is understood in a prospective, dynamic,
and systemic sense. It must also be understood that there are many ways of
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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The early resistance to implementing Brown's mandate may explain and,
in part, justify the Court's willingness to grant such broad equitable discretion
to the lower courts. However, Justice Thomas notes that "such powers should
have been temporary and used only to overcome the widespread resistance to
the dictates of the Constitution. The judicial overreaching we see before us
today perhaps is the price we now pay for our approval of such extraordinary
remedies in the past."'37
However, such broad standards also pose problems in identifying the
vestiges of unlawful segregation.'
For example, the passage of time and
the interplay of numerous socioeconomic factors may defy any rational limits
on judicial authority in devising a remedy as well as in determining whether
to relinquish court supervision over a remedial decree. Therefore, Justice
Thomas, in his concurrence, may be signaling that the Court should address
the problem by imposing more precise guidelines on the federal equitable
39
power.

Unfortunately, Jenkins I1 does not resolve equity's inherent vices; and
perhaps a solution does not exist. 4 However, the majority in Jenkins 1I
does appear to place some limits on the court's remedial decree powers, 4 '

eliminating the threat .... '").

137. Jenkins I, 115 S. Ct. at 2067 (Thomas, J., concurring).
138. See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 136, at 11 ("The absence of a textually-specific
prohibition does not deny the importance of these values .... [T]he further one moves
from text, the greater the risk of abuse; it is easier for judges, even unwittingly, to
enact into law their own preferences in the name of having discovered the true
meaning... of equality or liberty.").
139. Jenkins 11, 115 S. Ct. at 2071 ("But I believe that we must impose more
precise standards and guidelines on the federal equitable power, not only to restore
predictability to the law and reduce judicial discretion, but also to ensure that
constitutional remedies are actually targeted toward those who have been injured.").
See also Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal
EquitableRemedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661, 663 (1978) ("The federal judiciary is not
immune from the need for limitations based on functional differentiation. James

Madison observed that if the judicial power were joined with the legislative and
executive powers, the judge 'might behave with all the violence of an oppressor."')
(emphasis in original) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 326 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke
ed. 1961) (quoting Montesquieu)).
140. See Fiss, supra note 136, at 49 ("[S]ince the threat and constitutional value
that occasions the intervention can never be defined with great precision, the particular
choice of remedy can never be defended with any certitude.").
141. See, e.g., Nielsen, supra note 9, at 624-25 (noting that the Supreme Court
only requires that the remedial decree restore the victims to the position they would
have occupied in the absence of such conduct "to the extentpracticable"as opposed
to "the maximum degreepossible") (emphasis added).
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but the effects of these limits on future cases pose ambiguities that await
further clarification.
Nonetheless, Jenkins 11 establishes the following two principles. First
when a district court finds only an intradistrict violation, a district court cannot
order even an indirect interdistrict remedy because it is beyond the district
court's remedial authority. 42 Second, when a district court determines
whether or not a school district has achieved partially unitary status, student
academic achievement tests should not play a dominant role in the
calculus.'4 3
In finding that an indirect interdistrict remedy exceeds the scope of a
district court's remedial authority for combatting an intradistrict violation, the
majority rejected "desegregative attractiveness" as a justification for remedial
measures.' 44 As a basis for this rejection, the majority apparently rendered
its conclusion in the chicken and the egg dilemma: that desegregation, and
not segregation, caused "white flight" into the SSD's. Therefore, this "white
flight" did not create a significant segregative effect in the SSD's.145 Since
the goal of "desegregative attractiveness" has an interdistrict purpose, the
majority found that this purpose exceeded the violation's scope by targeting
a "condition
that does not violate the Constitution or does not flow from such
, 146
violation."
As a result the majority appears to place primary importance on the
existence of significant segregative effects on the surrounding districts before
even an indirect interdistrict remedy is permissible. 47 Consequently, as
Justice

142. Jenkins 11, 115 S. Ct. at 2051.
143. Id. at 2055.
144. Id. at 2052. Consequently, because the district court had based its order to
increase KCMSD salaries on "desegregative attractiveness," the Court found that this
order (designed to serve an interdistrict goal) fell outside the scope of the district
court's remedial authority. Id at 2055.
145. Id at 2053.
146. Id. at 2054 (quoting Milliken 11, 433 U.S. 267, 282 (1977)). See Jenkins11,
115 S. Ct. at 2073 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[T]he District Court exceeded its
authority by benefiting those who were not victims of discriminatory conduct.");
cf Jenkins 11, 115 S. Ct. at 2091 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Today, the Court declares
illegitimate the goal of attracting nonminority students. . . ."); see also Nielsen, supra
note 9, at 622 (arguing that "[t]he Supreme Court has now rejected not only mandatory
desegregation plans, but voluntary integration remedies as well. . . . , [and] [t]he
labeling of the goal as desegregative attractiveness is actually what the Court
disapproves of, not necessarily the steps taken by the district court, not the actual
programs implemented.").
147. Jenkins 1, 115 S. Ct. at 2053.
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Souter indicates in his dissent, the majority opinion limits remedial measures
with intended effects beyond territorial bounds when no segregative effects
exist in the non-violating districts.'48
To the extent that Gautreauxsuggests that no per se rule exists to bar a
remedy with intended effects on districts not found to have violated the
Constitution, 149 Jenkins II clarifies that the Court found the metropolitan
area remedy permissible in Gautreauxbecause the remedy involved a federal
agency (as opposed to a state and local political entities) and did not raise
federalism concems. 50
In addition, Jenkins 11 limited the role of student test scores when
determining if a school district has attained unitary status.' 5' Sharply
limiting reliance on test scores in determining whether the school district has
remedied the system-wide reduction in student achievement to the extent
practicable does not, however, signify that student test scores should play no
role. Rather, the Court indicated that test scores should not be the sole factor
that prohibits a school district from achieving partial unitary status regarding
student achievement.5 2
However, underlying the Court's critique of using student test scores as
a measure of remedial effectiveness, the Court perhaps is narrowing the
factors that would qualify as vestiges of unlawful segregation. For instance,
the Court discusses the influence of demographic changes that are independent
of de jure segregation yet affect racial composition and student
achievement.5 3
In addition, the Court stresses the importance of providing the school
districts with a "precise statement of [their] obligations under a desegregation
decree"'5 4 when identifying segregation's incremental effect on minority

148. Id. at 2088 (Souter, J., dissenting). See id. at 2060 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("What the District Court did . . . and how it transgressed the
constitutional bounds of its remedial powers, is to make desegregative attractiveness
the underlying goal of its remedy for the specific purpose of reversing the trend of
white flight.").
149. Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 298 (1976). See supra notes 51-60 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Milliken I and Gautreaux.
150. Jenkins 1, 115 S. Ct. at 2054.
151. Id.
at 2055.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. (quoting Board of Educ. of Oklahoma City Pub. Schs. v. Dowell, 498
U.S. 237,246(1991)). However, see Nagel, supranote 139, at 709-10 (proposing that
"a judicial decree specifying in detail how policy should be implemented intrudes
deeply into the executive function" and that "some degree of deference to the state
executive function with regard to specificity might interfere with the judicial function
less than executive compliance with the detailed judicial decree might interfere with
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol61/iss3/7
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student achievement and the quality education programs' goals.155
Therefore, external factors construed as too attenuated' 1 6 and lacking a
causal link.5 7 to the unlawful segregation may not be classified as vestiges
and, thus, not bar a determination of unitary status. Perhaps, a better test is
the one Justice Thomas proposed in his concurrence. For instance, the district
courts could bear the burden of explaining "how ' more
recent social or
58
demographic phenomena did not cause the 'vestiges. "

In sum, without analyzing the entirety of the numerous scholarly
commentary in the field, the Jenkins litigation serves as an extreme example
of two dangers endemic to institutional litigation and particularly
desegregation orders-(1) vast equitable discretion for the trial judge and (2)
vague legal standards." 9 Relying on such discretion and vague standards,
the district court ordered elaborate and costly remedies'" 16designed to attract
whites to the KCMSD and to increase student test scores. '
In the process, the district court assumed both the legislative function of
crafting detailed rules of prospective conduct as well as the executive role of
enforcing these declared rules.'62 Independent from partisan politics and not

the executive function").
155. Jenkins 11, 115 S. Ct. at 2055.

156. See Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
157. See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 496 (1992).

158. Jenkins 11, 115 S. Ct. at 2063-64 (Thomas, J., concurring).
159. See William A. Fletcher, The Discretionary Constitution: Institutional

Remedies and JudicialLegitimacy, 91 YALE L. J. 635, 644 (1982) ("The specificity
of the decree and the indeterminacy of the norms that guide its drafting make the trial
judge's remedial discretion more difficult to control, and hence more threatening, than
the discretion inherent in judicial rulemaking.").
160. See Nielsen, supra note 9, at 616-19 for a discussion of the trial court's
remedial orders. See also Jenkins 11, 115 S. Ct. at 2066 (Thomas, J., concurring)
("[T]he District Court here ordered massive expenditures by local and state authorities,
without congressional or executive authorization and without any indication that such
measures would attract whites back to the KCMSD or raise KCMSD test scores.").
161. See supranotes 16-20 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 5 and 8 for reference to the court-ordered remedial
programs. See also Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,
89 HARv. L. Rnv. 1281, 1297 (1976):
In public law litigation . . . factfinding is principally concerned with

'legislative' rather than 'adjudicative' fact .... The whole process begins
to look like the traditional description of legislation: Attention is drawn to
a 'mischief existing or threatened, and the activity of the parties and court
is directed to the development of on-going measures designed to cure the
mischief.
See also Nagel, supra note 139, at 711 ("When the welfare and behavior of virtually
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1996
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the district court arguably violated the
accountable to an electorate,
Constitution's two primary structural principles-() separation of powers (by
wielding legislative and executive power) and (2) federalism (by usurping the
state and local control over education)." 6
While all agree that the problems associated with formally segregated
school systems and the inner cities deserve governmental attention, our
political tradition and form of government do not condone giving the judiciary
the task of devising and implementing the solution. Such a complex problem
requires a coordinated response from the proper political spheres in the
legislative and executive branches at the state and local levels.'65

every resident of a state or city might be affected by ajudicial remedy, both the depth
and breadth of the intrusion into the functions ofthe executive and legislative branches
are most obvious.").
163. See Fletcher, supra note 159, at 641, 649 noting that in institutional
litigation:
ajudge moves far beyond the normal competence and authority of ajudicial
officer, into an arena where legal aspirations, bureaucratic possibilities, and
political constraints converge, and where ordinary legal rules are frequently
inapplicable" and that "[tjhe formulation ofthe remedial decree.., depends
.. on the moral and political intuitions of one person acting not only
without effective external control over his or her actions, but also without
even the internal control of legal norms.
164. Jenkins I, 115 S. Ct. at 2070 (Thomas, J., concurring):
Two clear restraints on the use of the equity power-federalism and the
separation of powers-derive from the very form of our Government.
Federal Courts should pause before using their inherent equitable powers to
intrude into the proper sphere of the States. We have long recognized that
education is primarily a concern of local authorities.
But see Chayes, supra note 162, at 1307:
Separation of powers comes in for a good deal of veneration in our political
and judicial rhetoric, but it has always been hard to classify all government
activity into three, and only three, neat and mutually exclusive categories.
In practice, all governmental officials, including judges, have exercised a
large and messy admixture of powers, and that is as it must be.
165. See Fletcher, supra note 159, at 645 (describing such complex problems as
"polycentric." "Polycentricity is the property of a complex problem with a number of
subsidiary problem 'centers,' each of which is related to the others, such that the
solution to each depends on the solution to all others .... [T]hey are ill-suited to
resolution by governmental decisionmaking authorities.").
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Although these branches' initial failure to follow the Constitution is
responsible for a portion of the current predicament, the federal judiciary
cannot legitimately maintain that this justifies its own disregard of the
Constitutional requirements of separation of powers and federalism.' 1 Both
cases constitute a disrespect for our Constitution and form of government.
"There simply are certain things that courts, in order to remain courts, cannot
and should not do. There is no difference between courts running
school
167
systems or prisons and courts running executive branch agencies."'
IV. CONCLUSION

In Jenkins II, the Supreme Court issued two rulings. First, it ruled that
increasing teacher and staff salaries to attain desegregative attractiveness
constitutes an impermissible interdistrict remedy to cure only an intradistrict
violation. Such remedies exceed the scope of the district court's remedial
authority.'66 Second the Court ruled that courts should not rely on student
achievement tests that measure whether students in the district have achieved
"national norms" as the dominant factor in determining unitary status. 69
However, Jenkins 11 does not provide clear guidance for lower courts.
Identifying the effects of a constitutional violation remains imprecise. 7 '
Similarly, no clear formula exists to determine when the school districts have
eliminated such elusive effects to the extent practicable in order to achieve
unitary status.' 7'

166. See, e.g., Nagel, supra note 139, at 680:
If neither Congress nor the executive nor the state institutions have the will
to cooperate with the judiciary to achieve the degree or form of redress
desired by the court, then it is entirely possible that the court's objective is

unwise. The great structural divisions of power in the Constitution were,
after all, designed on the assumption that no single decisionmaker should

be trusted.
(emphasis in original). But see Fletcher, supra note 159, at 637 (arguing that the trial
court's remedial discretion in institutional litigation is presumptively illegitimate;
however, this presumption of illegitimacy "may be overcome when the political bodies
that should ordinarily exercise such discretion are seriously and chronically in default.
In that event, and for so long as those political bodies remain in default, judicial
discretion may be a necessary and therefore legitimate substitute for political

discretion.").
167. Jenkins II, 115 S. Ct. at 2071 (Thomas, J., concurring).

168. Id.
at 2055.
169. Id.
170. See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text for a discussion of identifying

the vestiges of segregation.
171. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the unitary
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Nonetheless, the majority seems to strengthen the causal link required
for an effect to result from prior de jure segregation.'
A school district's
good faith effort and the identification of other socio-economic causes may
provide sufficient attenuation to disassociate the factor from the effects of past
segregation.'
CHERYL FEUTZ

status determination.
172. See supra notes 76-89 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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